

# EARNINGS LOSS UPON JOB LOSS AND MONETARY POLICY

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**Preliminary.** The views expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily coincide with the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or any other individual in or member of the Federal Reserve System

## INTRODUCTION

- Models of monetary policy (such as the New-Keynesian model) are used to capture the trade-off between inflation and unemployment.
  - HANK model allows us to better capture the costs of unemployment.
- Persistent earnings loss upon job displacement has been well documented.
  - Jacobson et al. (1993), von Wachter et al. (2009), Davis and von Wachter (2011).
- If monetary accommodation can reduce job destruction (and job displacement), monetary policy could have larger impact.
- I add the persistent earnings loss upon job displacement into the HANK model, and study implications for monetary policy.
  - Next addition: endogenous job destruction, wealthy hand-to-mouth.

# EARNINGS LOSS UPON JOB LOSS




Figure: Earnings Loss upon Job Loss, Data and Model

- In the model, upon job loss, worker's productivity drops by  $\delta_p = 0.34$ .
- When employed, productivity follows AR(1) with a positive drift.
- The model matches the profile of earnings loss upon job loss well.

## THEORIES OF LONG-RUN EARNINGS LOSS

- Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998): Skill depreciation during unemployment spells.
  - Earnings loss in the model is closest to this hypothesis.
- Krolikowski (2017): Those who lost their job have to start from the bottom of the job ladder.
- Huckfeldt (2022): Those who lose their job might have to switch occupations or industries.

# OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL

- Standard HANK (Heterogeneous-Agent New-Keynesian) model.
  - Heterogeneous workers:  $(p, e, h, a)$ .
  - Mortensen-Pissarides frictional labor market with random search.
  - A match could be destroyed by exogenous or endogenous separation.
  - Standard New-Keynesian set-up (quadratic nominal price adjustment cost).
  - Monetary authority following the standard Taylor rule.
- Effects of accommodative monetary policy.
  - Standard intertemporal substitution channel.
  - Standard wage channel.
  - Inflate the value of (matched) labor firms:
    - Higher job-finding rate.
    - Lower job-separation rate (→ Prevent skill depreciation).
    - Increase workers' earnings, and thus consumption

## WORKER'S PROBLEM

$$V(X, p, e, h, a) = \max_{a', c} [u(c) + \beta \mathbb{E} V(X', p', e', h', a')] \quad (1)$$

subject to:

$$c + p^a a' = (p^a + d^a) a + \begin{cases} (1 - \tau) wp & \text{if } e = 1 \\ \min(\phi_0 wp, \phi_1 \overline{wp}) & \text{if } e = 2 \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

$$a' \geq \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } h = 1 \\ a & \text{if } h = 2 \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

- (2) is the budget constraint. Non-financial income depends on the current employment status  $e$ .
- (3) is associated with the i.i.d. wealthy hand-to-mouth shock.

## DYNAMICS OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTIVITY ( $p$ )

- If a worker loses its job,  $p$  drops at  $\delta_p$ .
  - $\delta_p = 0.34$ , following Greenstone and Looney (2011).
- While employed,  $p$  goes up on average.
  - Mean reversion + positive drift of the AR(1) process.
- “super-productive” state is added to match income and wealth inequality.
  - Castañeda et al. (2003).

## LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS (e)

- An unemployed worker finds a job with job-finding rate  $f(p)$ .
  - Labor market is segmented by  $p$ .
  - Standard search and matching with aggregate matching function.
  - $f(p)$  is determined by how many firms post a vacancy, at cost  $\kappa(p)$ .
- A match produces  $xp$  each period.
  - $x$  is the marginal product per efficiency unit.
  - Bargaining outcome  $w$  follows:  $w = \omega_0 \bar{x} + \omega_1 (\log x - \log \bar{x})$
  - Profits of the firm:  $xp - wp$ .
- A match can be destroyed exogenously and endogenously (den Haan et al. (2000), Fujita and Ramey (2012))
  - Exogenous match destruction shock  $\lambda^x$
  - Endogenous match destruction shock  $\lambda^n(p) \leftarrow$  i.i.d. operating cost shock



## LABOR FIRM'S PROBLEM

$$J(X, p) = (x - w)p + \mathbb{E} \frac{1}{1+r} (1 - \lambda^x) \int \max \left[ \sum_{p'} \pi_{p'|p,1,1} J(X', p') - \epsilon^n, 0 \right] d\mu(\epsilon^n(p)) \quad (4)$$

- **Exogenous separation:**  $\lambda^x$
- **Endogenous separation:**  $\lambda^n = \text{Prob} \left[ \sum_{p'} \pi_{p'|p,1,1} J(X', p') - \epsilon^n < 0 \right]$
- Some (but not many) inefficient separations due to the ad-hoc wage rule.

# QUADRUPLE WHAMMY OF JOB LOSS




Figure: Earnings Loss, with and without Skill Depreciation

- Receive UI benefits instead of earnings.
- Skill depreciation (drop in  $p$ ).
- Higher job-destruction rate  $\lambda^n(p)$  with lower  $p \leftarrow \text{MP}$ .
- Lower job-finding rate  $f(p)$  with lower  $p \leftarrow \text{MP}$ .

# CONSUMPTION DYNAMICS UPON JOB LOSS




Figure: Consumption Decline, with and without Skill Depreciation

- **Data:** Consumption declines after a job loss by 5-13%, depending on country, sample selection, and expenditure categories.
- **Standard HA model:** small decline (2%).
- **Model with skill depreciation:** larger decline (12%).

## EXPERIMENTS

- Start from the economy with  $UR=5\%$ 
  - Unemployment as of the end of 2007.
- Large negative aggregate productivity shock hits the economy.
  - Size of the shock is calibrated such that the peak UR is 10%.
  - Peak unemployment rate during the Great Recession (GR).
- Quantify the long-term costs of the GR within the model.
  - Taking into account long-term earnings loss upon job loss.
  - Compare with the case without long-term earnings loss.
  - Compare with an alternative experiment under a more accommodative MP.
- Current version does not have endogenous match destruction!

# MACRO AGGREGATES DURING THE GREAT RECESSION




Figure: Macro Aggregates during the Great Recession Scenario

- Standard impulse response to a negative TFP shock.

## LONG-TERM COSTS OF JOB LOSS DURING THE GREAT RECESSION

Line	Name	Value
	Long-Term Costs of Job Loss per Worker (\$)	
1	With earnings loss, Steady state	74,393
2	With earnings loss, Great Recession	80,491
3	Without earnings loss, Great Recession	21,231
	Change in UR during the GR	
4	In percentage points	5.00
5	In thousands (Based on LF in 2019)	8,232
	Total Long-Term Costs of Job Loss (% of GDP)	
6	With earnings loss ( $2 \times 5$ )	3.10
7	Without earnings loss ( $3 \times 5$ )	0.82

- Long-term cost of job loss is about 4 times larger with earnings loss upon job loss.

## IMPACT OF ACCOMMODATIVE MONETARY POLICY

Line	Name	(% of GDP)
<b>Total Long-Term Costs with Earnings Loss</b>		
1	Baseline MP	3.10
2	Accommodative MP	2.84
3	Difference	<b>0.26</b>
<b>Total Long-Term Costs without Earnings Loss</b>		
4	Baseline MP	0.82
5	Accommodative MP	0.74
6	Difference	<b>0.07</b>

- Costs of earnings loss are smaller under the accommodative MP, because UR goes up less (to 9.6% instead of 10%).
- The long-term costs of job loss that can be mitigated by accommodative MP are larger, if earnings loss upon job loss are taken into account.
- Even larger if endogenous job destruction can be mitigated by the MP.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

- With earnings loss upon job loss, the empirically observed large decline in consumption expenditures upon job loss can be replicated.
- When long-term earnings loss is taken into account, the cost of job loss is larger, so is the potential impact of monetary policy that mitigate it.
- Monetary policy could be even more impactful with the followings:
  - Endogenous job destruction.
  - Endogenous  $\delta_p$  and larger earnings loss in recessions.
  - Hand-to-mouth.



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